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 The study has the objectives of examining the 
impact of sub- national debts on economic 
development. The study covered the period of 
1996 to 2018 and data were sourced from Central 
Bank of Nigeria and Debt Management Office. The 
study adopted the Fully Modified Ordinary Least 
Squares and Granger Causality. The Fully Modified 
OLS was used to investigate the both long run and 
short run relationships while the Granger Causality 
was used for direction of causality. The result 
showed that state government has a statistically 
significant positive relationship with the growth 
rate of GDP while Local government debt (LDEBT) 
and exchange rate had a significant inverse 
relationship with the growth of GDP. The Interest 
rate (INT) has positive sign but not significant. The 
paper recommended that the Federal Government 
of Nigeria should ensure that   fiscal discipline 
should be enshrined to curtail diversion of loans 
received to unproductive channels. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Recent momentous discourse of subnational insolvency in the global space 
reinforces the continuing validity of subnational debt management principles and its 
relevance to contemporary issues and problems of economic development. 
Subnational debt is conterminous to a ‘’ Knife Edge’’ innovative fiscal financing 
mechanism capable of invigorating social welfare benefits when employed for 
productive investment while triggering a chaotic macroeconomic environment 
when raised beyond certain permissible optimal threshold. The tripartite challenge 
for debt management experts and policy analyst becomes the implementation of 
polices that guarantees the congenial achievement of subnational borrowing 
autonomy while preserving subnational fiscal sustainability and assuring cohesion 
in national development.  
Proponents of subnational debt argue that decentralization of borrowing 
contribute to enhancing expenditure efficiency (Sow and Razafimahefa, 2015, Fretes 
Cibils and Ter-Minassian, 2015).Evidence from developed economies shows that 
this seems to be particularly the case in social sectors such as education and health 
(Ahmad et al, 2008). Accordingly, Steiner (2007) posited that National development 
and poverty alleviation often hinges on subnational growth and service delivery. 
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Subnational borrowing is incurred to undertake varied infrastructure investment 
needs required to achieve a quantum leap in developmental strides and meet needs 
at the local level, including utilities, transportation, health, education and 
environmental protection. Furthermore, rapid urbanization in developing countries 
is requiring large-scale infrastructure financing to help absorb influxes of rural 
populations (Canuto, O and L. Liu, 2017). 
Cynics affirm that subnational borrowing is capable of exacerbating 
macroeconomic disturbance consequently constraining the ability of subnational 
units/governments to meet their financial obligations and there could be serious 
shortcomings that policymakers should be aware of in designing decentralization 
policies (Breton 2002; Crook, 2003).  Government accountability and allocative 
efficiency may not be achieved with decentralization when the scarcity of public 
sector administrative, financial and managerial capacity is more problematic at the 
lower levels of government (Crook, 2003; Collier, 2008). Furthermore, the 
prevailing budgetary stringency, inimical sub national debt control frameworks, 
porous institutional capacity, mismanagement of Subnational debt, the history of 
subnational government defaults, give central governments substantial raison d’être 
to antagonize subnational government debt autonomy. Decentralization may impose 
constraints to the implementation of national policies and the creation of 
coordination channels across regions (Guldner, 1995). Endemic poverty, 
compounded in many developing countries by an onerous sub national debt burden, 
is today a major destabiliser of national developmental policies. 
That Notwithstanding, granting borrowing autonomy to subnational units is 
a defining leitmotif of federalism with each State possessing the right and 
responsibility of sourcing finance for developmental purpose despite  receiving 
allocation from the central government .This assertion is a truism in the Nigerian 
context following increased responsibilities to subnational government enshrined in 
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution reflecting changing paradigm in fiscal relation in 
intergovernmental finance (Imandojemu, 2017). Nigeria is structured with three 
tiers of government (federal, state, and local), with 36 states and 774 local    
governments.  States control 50 percent of government resources and have primary 
responsibility for education and certain aspects of the health system. State 
governance capacity, however, varies widely (World Bank/DFID 2005). Taken 
together-the growing decentralization of developmental efforts, divergence between 
states’ increased responsibilities and available resources makes sub national 
borrowing inevitable, since it provides ample opportunity to ameliorate 
development financing problematique on the spot rather than waiting for central 
government allocation.  
    Critical investment in local, sub national and regional infrastructure and 
encouraging industrial value chains integration are some of the targets of SDG 9. We 
often point to the deplorable state of most roads; archaic rail lines and limited 
coverage; the intractable bottlenecks of power supply; and poor physical conditions 
of our educational and medical institutions as evidences of the low level of 
infrastructure supply in Nigeria (Roberts, 2016). Subnational borrowings for 
delivering sound infrastructural investment on the basis of local needs and the 
achievement of SDG targets is capable of engendering equity in the distributional 
mechanism of growth process, achieving sustainable development and reducing the 
sprout of poverty.  
However, there is the somber contrast between sub national debt and 
economic development in Nigeria. Since the 1980s, subnational borrowings in 
Nigeria as a whole increased fivefold. Total debt profile of the states in 2015 and 
2016 was N3.03tn and N3.89tn respectively. Average growth rate of states’ debt 
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between 2012 and 2016 remains elevated at 22.16%, while average growth rate of 
internally generated revenue is 9.04%. Clearly, the sustainable part for states is to 
rein in debt uptake and focus more on improving internally generated revenue 
(Budgit, 2017). Despite receiving about half the national revenue – a sum of N2.7 
trillion in 2014 (US$13.5 billion at current official exchange rate) – state 
governments fail to provide the services that could materially improve the lives of 
tens of millions of Nigerians (Adams, 2016). Most states generate minimal revenue 
outside their monthly allocation of Nigeria’s anaemic oil income. They depend 
almost exclusively on monthly allocations of federal revenues, which have declined 
sharply in line with global crude oil price (Page, 2016). The current accretion in oil 
revenue dampened allocation from the central government. At present, however, the 
ability of the States to provide essential services to their citizenry is at risk and 
several are in a challenging financial position. Since 2011, total State government 
revenues have declined by 8 per cent a year, while expenditures have increased by 4 
per cent a year. At the end of 2015, State expenditures exceeded revenues by 
approximately N1 trillion (Ministry of Budget & National planning, 2017). Nigeria’s 
States are facing a significantly dire fiscal cycle; most are struggling to meet core 
obligations, including the payment of civil servant salaries and/or pensions, the 
servicing of overhanging debt and seeing to the day-to-day running of government, 
with concomitant negative impact on individual well-being and general economic 
activity. The first clear indicator that Nigeria’s States were teetering into financial 
ruin came when at least two-thirds of all 36 governors demanded a federal 
government relief package, due to their inability to pay salaries and benefits to civil 
servants for months, and in some cases, over a year. State governments therefore 
currently have very limited space to maneuver, as most are neck-deep in debt which 
was accumulated under the baseless assumption that crude oil prices would remain 
above the $80/barrel mark (BudgiT, 2017).  
The backward state of economic development despite mounting subnational 
debts raises serious oxymora for policy analyst and experts in debt management. 
Quite surprisingly, country specific examination of the permissible subnational debt 
threshold remains in its infancy. Available literature reviews are usually on the 
empirical validation of the nexus between sub national debt and economic 
development. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge none has examined the 
permissible threshold of subnational debt to economic growth level which is a sin-
qua-non for effective debt management. This identified gap in the dearth of available 
literature review is a motivating factor for conducting this research. Against this 
framework, the objective of the research work is to examine the permissible 
subnational debt threshold and economic development in Nigeria. The remaining 
sections of the paper are as follows: section two presents a brief review of empirical 
literature; stylized facts on subnational debt is presented in three; the details of data 
and methodology used in this paper are presented in section four; the analysis of 
empirical findings  are discussed in section five; and section six concludes with some 
policy recommendations. 
 
METHOD 
In order to empirically investigate the impact of excise tax on economic 
growth in Nigeria, the researcher adopted the model of Martinez- Vazquez and 
Vulovic (2016) with slight modification. The functional form of Martinez- Vazquez 
and Vulovic (2016) model is:  
= ( , )    
 (12) 
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Hence, the operational estimated form of the model is as shown in equation 13. 
tttt LDEBTSDEBTRGDP   210    
 (13) 
The author modified Martinez- Vazquez and Vulovic model by adding exchange 
(EXC) and interest rate (INTR). Thus Equation (13) with the additional variables 
give Equation (14). 
tttttt INTREXCLDEBTSDEBTRGDP   43210             
(14) 
The author converted all variables in monetary values to logarithm and this 
produces Equation 15. 
tttttt INTREXCLDEBTSDEBTGDPGR   logloglog 43210
     (15) 
   β > 0,β > or < 0,β > or < 0,β < O and β < 0  
Where GDPGR = GDP growth rate, SDEBT = State debt, LDEBT = Local debt, 
EXC= exchange rate, INTR = interest rate and β0 – β4 = parameters to be estimated.
21,  and  are considered  either positive or negative because theoretically an 
increase in debt(borrowing) by the state and local authorities could increase deficit 
and crowd out future investment by the limited government revenue required to 
service debt. However, State and local government debt when used judiciously for 
investment in developmental project can revamp the economy. Subsequently, an 
increase debt by the current government will decrease future investment by 
successive government for led to economic growth decline.  are both 
negative because higher exchange and interest rates discourages foreign trade and 
domestic investment component in the aggregate national income respectively.  In this study, the author employed Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. This 
test operates under the hypothesis of series has unit root and Akaike criterion is 
used to decide optimal lag length. The ADF test has the following model: 
∆ = + + + ∆ + , □IID(0,σ )                                       (16) 
In equation 16, ∆ is the difference operator, X is the natural logarithm of the 
series, T is a trend variable, λ and  are the parameters to be estimated and  is the 
error term, which is independently and identically distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance. The stationarity test provides a ground to determine the order of 
integration of the variables employed in the model. One point to note is that if the 
variables are integrated of different orders, then there is need to look for co- 
integration. The author employed Johansen’s approach to measure this long- run 
equilibrium relationship among the variables. It is made up of estimating a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models, which includes difference as well as the levels of the 
non- stationary variables. The model for estimating cointegration is specified as 
follows: 
∆ = + + ∆ + , IID(0,σ )                                      (17) 
In equation 17, ∆  and ∆  are vectors and are of l(1) variables, and π 
are the matrices of parameters estimated using OLS, and  is the Gaussian random 
variable. The rank, π determines the long- run equilibrium relationship amongst the 
variables and is sometimes represented by r. The component  produces 
different linear combinations of the levels of the time series, . The model shows 
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that if the rank of the coefficient matrix π is 1, or greater than 1, there exist one or 
more cointegrating vectors; hence, there is long- run relationship among the series 
of the model.  
 Equation 13 is transformed into ECM equation; it is therefore specified as 
follows: 
∆ = + ∑ ∆ +∑ ∆ + ∑ ∆ +
∑ ∆ + +     (18)             
                                                                                                                                                                                        
The hypothesis of non- causality can be test at levels form of the variables 
using equation 19 and 22. Thus, we used the pair wise Granger Causality test which 
is stated as follows given two variables. 
Granger Causality Equation of Gross Domestic Product on Growth Rate 
(GRGDP) and State debt (lnSDEBT) 
=  + +                     (19 ) 
=  + +                    (19 ) 
Granger Causality Equation of Gross Domestic Product on Growth rate 
(GDPGR) and Local debt (lnLDEBT) 
=  + +                   (20 ) 
=  + +                     (20 ) 
Granger Causality Equation of Gross Domestic Product on Growth rate 
(GDPGR) and Interest Rate (InINTR) 
=  + +                  (21 ) 
=  + +                  (21 ) 
Granger Causality Equation of Gross Domestic Product on Growth Rate 
(GDPGR) and Exchange Rate (EXC) 
=  + +                             (22 ) 
=  + +                                    (22 ) 
Where the non- causality is determined by the significance of α and β 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter examines, presents and analyses the data. We began by 
presenting the descriptive statistics of the data used. We later carried out the pre-
diagnostic test:- unit root test and co integration test. We concluded by estimating 
both short-run relationship with the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares 
Techniques. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
We considered important statistics of each series in Table 1 and provided 
explanations on the statistics.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
STATISTICS GDPGR
                       
lnSDEBT             EXC         LnINTR  
          
lnLDEBT 
 Mean  5.6801  7.2100  117.2150  4.8570  4.3712 
 Median  4.8873  7.8693  129.0000  6.9153  4.5663 
 Maximum  33.7358  8.9162  253.0925  8.6695  6.1601 
 Minimum -1.6000  3.7674  21.8860 -7.7101  1.6146 
 Std. Dev.  6.7490  1.4976  60.2009  5.4511  1.4327 
 Skewness  3.2147 -0.7939 -0.2284 -1.5449 -0.4577 
 Kurtosis  14.3315  2.4639  2.8930  3.7355  1.9669 
 Jarque-Bera  162.6691  2.6919  0.2109  9.6680  1.8260 
 Probability  0.0000  0.2602  0.899880  0.0079  0.4013 
 Obs  23  23  23  23  23 
Source: Author’s Computation 
 
The mean shows the measure of central tendency and it can reveal the 
presence of outliers in data. In Table 1, all the values of the mean are to the left of 
the median except GDPGR. This may indicate the presence of outliers in those series. 
The values obtained for standard deviations showed that there is no evidence of 
extreme values in the series except for exchange rate. All the values are small in size 
(See Table 1). The Skewness has negative values except GDPGR. They are leftly 
skewed. It is only GDPGR and Interest rate (NINTR) that have value higher than 3 for 
Kurtosis. There is evidence of normal distribution in these series. Other series are 
less than 3. The GDPGR and INT are not normally distributed in terms of values 
obtained from Jarque Bera Statistics. Their p- values are less than the 0.05 level of 
significance. Other series are greater than 5% level of significance.  Since the 
skewness value of GDPGR is greater than zero, it can be concluded that the GDPGR is 
normally distributed also. Since all these series are normally distributed, there is 
evidence for reliability in the estimation to be carried out and therefore the result 
can be trusted. 
 
UNIT ROOT TEST 
Prior to testing for cointegration, a unit root rest must be carried out to 
determine the stationarity of the series. The presence of a unit root in a series 
implies that if there were any disturbance in the trend of such series, it will not be 
able to recover back to its original M trend pattern.  The null hypothesis for the test 
is that the series has unit root. This study makes use of ADF Unit Root test because it 
is among the common test for unit root. 
 
Table 2: Test of Unit Root with ADF 
Variables  Level/Difference Critical Value 
(ADF)  
ADF ORDER 
GDPGR Level 
 
-3.0048 
 
-3.7789 
 
1(0) 
lnSDEBT Level 
First Diff. 
-3.0207 
-3.0123 
-1.1791 
-7.3332 
 
1(1) 
lnLDEBT Level -3.0048 --3.0811 1(0) 
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lnINTR Level 
First Diff. 
-3.0048 
-3.0123 
-2.6780 
-7.8442 
  
1(1) 
EXC*  Level 
First Diff. 
-1.9572 
-1.9581 
 2.2036 
-2.0190 
 1(0) 
 
  
Source: Author’s Computation 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the unit root test estimation on the series using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller. All the series are stationary at first difference 5% 
significant level except lnLDEBT. Log of LDEBT (lnLDEBT) is stationary at level (See 
Appendix Three). 
 
Cointegration Test 
The researcher proceeds to cointegration test after confirming the stationarity of 
each series. The result was given in Table 3. Johansen Cointegration technique is 
employed to check for the existence of the long run relationship among the series. 
 
Table 3: Trace Test Results of Cointegration Test  
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Statistics  Critical 
Values 
P- Values 
Model I; SERIES: GDPGR, lnSDEBT, lnLDEBT, lnINTR, EXC 
r = 0 r ≥ 1  115.9998  69.81889  0.0000 
r ≤1 r ≥ 2  72.19208  47.85613  0.0001 
r ≤2 r ≥ 3  37.97949  29.79707  0.0046 
r ≤3 r ≥ 4  18.06931  15.49471  0.0200 
r ≤4 r ≥ 5  6.294447  3.841466  0.0121 
Source: Author’s Computation 
 
Table 3 shows that there are five co-integrating equations for Trace test. 
This result shows that the series in each of the models are co-integrated and 
therefore they have an error correction representation. 
 
ERROR CORRECTION MECHANISM 
Table 4: Error Correction Mechanism 
Dependent Variable: D(GDPGR)   
Method: Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)  
Date: 12/17/17   Time: 07:01  
     
     Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic            Prob.   
     
     D(LNSDEBT) 3.4826 2.4930 0.0258
D(LNINTR) 0.1671 0.9891 0.3394
D(LNLDEBT) -0.9640 -1.0861 0.2958
D(EXC) -0.0250 -0.5132 0.6158
ECM(-1) -1.0728 -6.4864 0.0000
C 4.7660 1.0954 0.2918
  
     R-squared 0.6229  
Adjusted R-squared 0.4882  
S.E. of regression 6.5821  
Long-run variance 19.0468   
     Source: Author’s    
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The coefficient of ECM is –1.0729 with a prob value of 0.0000. The ECM 
coefficient has the correct negative sign and it indicates a speed of adjustment of 
107.29% which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This means that any 
disequilibrium in the system can be restored at a speed of adjustment of 107.29% 
which is considered to be very fast. 
The result of the Error Correction Model indicates that the selected 
explanatory variables jointly have a significant relationship with Growth Rate of 
Gross Domestic Product in the short-run. The Coefficient of determination (R2) 
shows that the explanatory variables explained 62.79% of the total variation in 
Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate. The Fully Modified OLS do not report F-
statistic and the Durbin Watson statistic  
 The estimate of the constant is 4.7660 implying that if all the independent 
variables are zero, Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate will approximately be 
4.77%.  The short run coefficient for the State government debt (SDEBT) is 3.4827. 
This implies that both SDEBT has a direct relationship the Growth rate of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDPGR). This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level, as the pro value has shown. The Local government debt (LDEBT) on the other 
hand, is -0.9640%. The sign of the coefficient implies that LDEBT has an indirect 
relationship the Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDPGR) in the short run. 
The relationship is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, as the pro value has 
shown.  
Exchange rate (EXC) has a coefficient of -0.0250 indicating an indirect 
relationship between Exchange rate and GDPGR in the short run. This conforms to 
a’priori expectation and not statistically significant as indicated by the prob value of 
0.6158%. Interest Rate also has a direct relationship with the GDPGR with a 
coefficient of 0.1671%. This relationship does not agrees with a’priori expectation 
and not significant as indicated by the prob value. 
The researcher proceeds to over- parameterisation ECM. The result is 
reported in Appendix Five. The result showed that none of the variables and their 
lags is significant. The researcher therefore carried out parsimonious ECM and the 
result is reported as Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Parsimonious ECM 
Dependent Variable: D(GDPGR)   
Method: Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)  
Date: 12/17/17   Time: 07:08   
     
     Variable         Coefficient                t-Statistic                  Prob.   
     
     D(LNSDEBT) 4.0415 2.6272 0.0177 
ECM(-1) -1.0135 -5.4495 0.0000 
C 0.1718 0.1494 0.8830 
  
  R-squared 0.5935
Adjusted R-squared 0.5457
S.E. of regression 6.2016
Long-run variance 25.8592
          Source: Author’s Computation 
 
   
Imandojemu /Quantitative Economics Research 2019, 2(1): 32-43. 
 
 
 
40
The coefficient of ECM is -1.035 with a prob value of 0.0000. The ECM 
coefficient has the correct negative sign and it indicates a speed of adjustment of 
103.5% which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This means that any 
disequilibrium in the system can be restored at a speed of adjustment of 103.5% 
which is considered to be very fast. The parsimonious ECM estimates shows that 
State government debt (SDEBT) able to explain 59.35% of the total variation in the 
Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product.  
The result shows that in the parsimonious ECM, State government debt 
(SDEBT) has a positive relationship with the Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product 
D(GDPGR), with a coefficient of 4.041. This relationship does not conform to a’priori 
expectation though it was also found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance. This finding shows that State government debt promotes economic 
growth in the short run. A 1% change in State government debt leads to 4.04% 
increase in GDP growth rate. 
 
GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST 
In order to investigate the causal relationship among the variables, Granger 
causality test was employed to ascertain the direction of causality between State 
government debt and Gross Domestic Product in Nigeria. 
 
Table 6: Granger Causality Test for State government debt (lnSDEBT) and GDPGR  
Date: 12/17/17   Time: 21:49 
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     LNSDEBT does not Granger Cause GDPGR  21  1.3041 0.2988 
 GDPGR does not Granger Cause LNSDEBT  0.2123 0.8109 
        Source: Author’s Computation 
 
From table 6, the null hypothesis that State government debt (lnSDEBT) 
does not granger cause GDPGR has an F-statistic of 1.3041 and a pro value of 
0.2988. Since the pro value is greater than 0.05, it indicates that the F-statistics is 
not statistically significant hence, the null hypothesis that lnSDEBT does not 
granger cause GDPGR is accepted.  
 Secondly, the null hypothesis that GDPGR does not granger cause lnSDEBT 
has a F-statistic of 0.2123 with a pro value of 0.8109. Since the pro value is greater 
than 0.05, it indicates that the F-statistic is not statistically significant. Hence, the 
null hypothesis can be accepted which implies that GDPGR does not granger cause 
lnSDEBT. Hence, there is no causality between GDPGR and lnSDEBT. 
 
Table 7: Granger Causality Test for Local government debt (LDEBT) and GDPGR  
Sample: 1994 2016  
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic  Prob.  
    
     LNLDEBT does not Granger Cause GDPGR  21  0.0086 0.9914 
 GDPGR does not Granger Cause LNLDEBT  1.6248 0.2278 
        Source: Author’s Computation 
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The result in Table 7 showed that lnLDEBT does not granger cause GDPGR in 
Nigeria. The pro- value (0.9914) is greater than the 0.05 level of significance. While 
the GDPGR does not granger cause LDEBT. The pro- value (0.2278) is greater than 
the 0.05 level of significance. The researcher therefore concludes that there is no 
causality between lnLDEBT and GDPGR. 
 
Table 8: Granger Causality Test for Interest Rate (INTR) and GDPGR  
Sample: 1994 2016  
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic  Prob.  
    
     LNINT does not Granger Cause GDPGR  21  0.65525 0.5327 
 GDPGR does not Granger Cause LNINT  0.31050 0.7374 
            Source: Author’s Computation 
 
The result above showed that there is no causality between lnINTR and the 
GDPGR. The pro- value is 0.0202 and is less than the 0.05 level of significance. We 
can therefore say that lnINTR granger causes GDPGR. On the other hand, the result 
further showed that the GDPGR does not granger cause lnINT Rin Nigeria. The pro- 
value is 0.7923 and is greater than the 0.05 level of significance. There is therefore 
no causality between GDPGR and lnINTR. 
 
Table 9: Granger Causality Test for Exchange Rate (EXC) and GDPGR 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1994 2016  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     EXC does not Granger Cause GDPGR  21  0.1463 0.8651 
 GDPGR does not Granger Cause EXC  0.3635 0.7008 
        Source: Author’s Computation 
 
From table 9, the null hypothesis that Exchange Rate (EXC) does not granger 
cause GDPGR has an F-statistic of 0.1463 and a pro value of 0.8651. Since the pro 
value is greater than 0.05, it indicates that the F-statistics and not statistically 
significant hence, the null hypothesis that EXC does not granger cause GDPGR is 
accepted.  
Secondly, the null hypothesis that GDPGR does not granger cause EXC has a F-
statistic of 0.3635 with a pro value of 0.7008. Since the pro value is greater than 
0.05, it indicates that the F-statistic is not statistically significant. Hence, the null 
hypothesis can be accepted which implies that GDPGR does not granger cause EXC. 
Hence, there is no causality between GDPGR and EXC. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The study has the objective of investigating the impact of sub- national debts 
on economic development in Nigeria. The findings of the study have shown that 
economic development is promoted through debts received from the state 
government and local government both in the short run and long run periods The 
study therefore concludes that there is need for the Federal Government to 
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moderate the debts received by both the state government and local government 
and not to put embargo on their applications for loans. 
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